File Name: us and iran nuclear deal .zip
Withdrawing from the deal, however, will hardly contribute to achieving any of his stated objectives. In fact, his decision has been harmful in several respects. Other states in the region — notably Saudi Arabia — might be tempted to emulate it and engage in a regional nuclear arms race.
- Israel on war footing as US mulls return to Iran nuclear deal
- Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
- strategic and international studies
- What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?
For the next 15 years Iran will only enrich uranium up to 3. Iran also agreed not to build any new heavy-water facilities for the same period of time. Uranium-enrichment activities will be limited to a single facility using first-generation centrifuges for 10 years.
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Israel on war footing as US mulls return to Iran nuclear deal
Originally published in Al Jazeera America. When negotiations began in between Iran and three European powers over its nuclear work, Tehran was struggling to assemble uranium-enrichment centrifuges.
The current round of negotiations that concluded successfully in Vienna on July 14, , saw Iran in possession of more than 18, centrifuges. Even then, a nuclear-armed Iran was neither imminent nor inevitable.
Although a number of additional matters delayed the achievement of a deal at the eleventh hour, four key issues were at the core of international concerns over Tehran's nuclear activities:.
Iran's enrichment process is based on using centrifugal force to purify the active isotope in natural uranium. Depending on the level of purity to which it is enriched, the resulting fissile material could fuel nuclear reactors, be used medically or serve as bomb material. Iran has two main enrichment facilities and refines uranium to two levels. Less than 5 percent is used for reactors to create electricity, and 20 percent used in research reactors to produce medical isotopes.
The country has one nuclear power plant in Bushehr and one research reactor in Tehran. Given that fuel for Bushehr is provided by Russia and that Iran has already enriched enough fuel for the Tehran research reactor, many suspect that Iran's enrichment activities may not have exclusively innocent goals.
The absence of a viable economic rationale for domestic enrichment — and the scarcity of uranium in Iran — exacerbates suspicions. But Iranian leaders contend that eventual expansion of the country's peaceful nuclear program necessitates indigenous nuclear fuel production.
Iran's enrichment activities are monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA , which also safeguards all the nuclear material in the country. Iran's main enrichment facility is in Natanz and houses about 15, centrifuges.
The majority of centrifuges Iran has installed there are the so-called first generation IR-1s. These are based on a s design and are prone to regular mechanical breakdowns. Consequently, Iran has been working on developing more advanced centrifuges. These machines are not yet enriching uranium but are estimated to be at least three times as efficient. Iran's second enrichment facility, Fordow, is under a mountain near the holy city of Qom and is believed to be impervious to an Israeli airstrike.
Iran has installed nearly 3, IR-1 machines there but is currently operating only one-third of them. Accumulation of enriched uranium in Iranian facilities is another source of concern, as such material could more rapidly be further refined to reach weapons grade above 80 percent.
As of Aug. With further enrichment — if Iran expelled inspectors — that stockpile could be turned into material for five nuclear weapons in six months to a year. Iran's accumulation of uranium enriched to 20 percent is particularly worrisome, as that level of enrichment reduces by more than 90 percent the time it would take to turn natural uranium into bomb material. Tehran, however, has thus far kept the size of its 20 percent stockpile below the red line set last year by Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which is about kilograms enough for one bomb if re-enriched.
It has done this by oxidizing enriched uranium and converting it into fuel rods for reactors, a process that renders weaponization far more difficult. Iran is constructing a heavy-water research reactor in the city of Arak. This can open a second path — followed by most nuclear proliferators — to nuclear weapons.
Separating plutonium from a reactor's spent fuel rods, however, requires a reprocessing facility that Iran neither currently has nor has demonstrated any intention of building. But this might not matter to Israel, which twice before has attacked suspected reactors in countries in the region — in Iraq in and in Syria in — before their completion, since striking an operational reactor would result in an environmental catastrophe.
Iran's construction of undeclared nuclear enrichment and heavy-water facilities was exposed in by an exiled opposition group, triggering an international crisis. Nine years later, the IAEA detailed charges that before , Tehran experimented with technologies critical for the development of nuclear warheads, warning that some such research work may be ongoing.
While the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty entitles Iran to enrich and stockpile uranium and construct a heavy-water reactor for civilian purposes, at issue is whether Tehran is in compliance with all its responsibilities under Article II of the treaty, which requires signatory nations to refrain from seeking or receiving any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Six U. Security Council resolutions have demanded that Iran suspend these activities until international confidence is restored in the purely peaceful nature of its program, and a decade of negotiations between Iran and Western powers has thus far failed to resolve the nuclear standoff.
Guessing Iran's timeline for attaining nuclear weapon status has been a popular pastime of analysts, pundits and politicians for almost two decades. But most of these estimates are based on misplaced alarmism, for three main reasons:. No state has built nuclear weapons while under scrutiny of in-country IAEA inspectors.
In fact, of the five countries that developed nuclear weapons in the past four decades, four Pakistan, India, South Africa and Israel were not signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore were never under IAEA inspection, and North Korea expelled the inspectors before testing its nuclear device.
IAEA inspectors visit Iran's nuclear facilities almost weekly. And time favors the inspectors. Alarmist warnings about Iran reaching breakout capability — the ability to process low-enriched uranium into weapons grade fissile material — omits the simple fact that if Iran decided to produce weapons-grade uranium, it would have to reconfigure its centrifuge cascades. That process usually takes one to two weeks and would undoubtedly be detected by the IAEA.
It is extremely unlikely that Iran could even buy time by delaying the inspectors' visit through pretexts, given that such action is likely to prompt international opprobrium and even serve as a casus belli. A country reaches the military nuclear threshold when it has the capacity to manufacture one or more nuclear weapons within weeks. But it defies strategic logic for a country to accept risks of a military confrontation with more powerful adversaries simply in order to develop a single crude nuclear device.
To acquire real nuclear deterrence, Iran would need a deployable nuclear arsenal, not just enough material for one bomb. It would need to test a nuclear device and marry it with an appropriate delivery vehicle.
And it is nearly impossible that Iran could reach such a capability in less than a year without being detected and stopped by the U. All previous Iranian efforts to conceal nuclear activities were exposed in their nascent stages. Likewise, it is useful to remember than given the United States' significant standing capabilities in the region, it would take less than 24 hours for the U.
Iranian leaders have pledged to never make nuclear weapons, which they consider a violation of Islam. The U. In contrast to lack of evidence of any political decision by Iran to cross the nuclear Rubicon, the Iranian government has provided plenty of evidence that it wants a nuclear deal. Besides verbal declarations by its leadership, a number of Iranian decisions in managing nuclear work have been read as signaling a desire to avoid provoking confrontation.
For example, Tehran has converted approximately 60 percent of its 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile to uranium oxide, which is less prone to proliferation, as its further enrichment requires weeks of chemical processing detectable by the IAEA.
Tehran could double its enrichment at Fordow by turning on nearly 2, centrifuges that it has installed at the facility but are not yet operating. The same applies to the IR-2m machines. Iran has also delayed the previously announced completion date the first quarter of of the Arak reactor. Analysts see these moves as signs that Tehran is preparing bargaining chips to negotiate relief from the Western sanctions that have debilitated its economy. As Clapper said, "Iran's nuclear decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran.
With 17 declared nuclear facilities and nearly five decades in the making, Iran's nuclear program is quite extensive. It has also been expensive, given the cost of harsh sanctions that the program has incurred. Yet it has become a point of national pride because Iran has developed indigenous nuclear know-how.
Such an accord would limit the scale and scope of Iran's nuclear work, enhance the IAEA's monitoring capabilities and allow Iran to rejoin the international community.
This week on Hold Your Fire! The unintended consequences highlight the responsibility that comes with the power to impose these penalties, as does the difficulty of reversing them.
Concern 2: Fissile material stockpile Accumulation of enriched uranium in Iranian facilities is another source of concern, as such material could more rapidly be further refined to reach weapons grade above 80 percent. Concern 3: Heavy-water reactor Iran is constructing a heavy-water research reactor in the city of Arak. So how close is Iran to being able to build nuclear weapons — assuming that is its intention?
But most of these estimates are based on misplaced alarmism, for three main reasons: Reason 1: International inspections No state has built nuclear weapons while under scrutiny of in-country IAEA inspectors. Reason 2: The cost-benefit rationale A country reaches the military nuclear threshold when it has the capacity to manufacture one or more nuclear weapons within weeks.
Reason 3: The lack of a political decision Iranian leaders have pledged to never make nuclear weapons, which they consider a violation of Islam. Related Tags Iran. Originally published in World Politics Review. Up Next. Episode U. Yes, I Agree.
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Furthermore, it has permitted the more intrusive IAEA monitoring inspections, including the implementation of the Additional protocol. Granting significant economic benefits to Iran through the increase in oil exports and resuming banking transactions, the JCPOA was a significant diplomatic achievement for the regional and international security. However, the prior diplomatic efforts have whittled away in the aftermath of the US unilateral withdrawal from the deal and reimposition of the crippling sanctions regime, which swept away all the economic incentives for Iran to stick to its commitments envisioned by the deal. Following the fifth breach announced by Iran on 5 January, the E3 launched the dispute resolution process, which is laid out in the JCPOA, viewing the dispute resolution mechanism as the only way to incite the Iranian authorities to resume compliance to the JCPOA. However, by invoking such measures, the E3 states are setting in motion a process that might end up in the UN Security Council resulting in the UN sanctions snapping back.
Program Studi Hubungan Internasional, President University US foreign policy toward the threat of Iranian nuclear program from Bill Clinton pdf. Crowley, M. (, 12 28). How Trump could kill the Iran nuclear deal in.
strategic and international studies
The agreed JCPOA documents consist of total pages of text, including 18 pages of the JCPOA itself, with a further pages divided among five annexes, including a dispute settlement mechanism. That such a diverse set of state parties, with decades of varying levels of antipathetic relations among them, could come to such a detailed and comprehensive settlement concerning an issue of such high international security sensitivity, was seen by many as nothing short of miraculous, and as a great triumph for diplomatic approaches to the settlement of nuclear proliferation concerns. As with any successful diplomatic accord, all sides were able to declare victory to both international and domestic constituencies through the terms of the JCPOA. Within the context of international nuclear nonproliferation agreements, the JCPOA was a fascinatingly novel and exciting development. Agreements among states on nuclear arms and nuclear energy have for decades typically taken the form of formally adopted treaties, constituting obligations of international law for the parties thereto.
What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?
Originally published in Al Jazeera America. When negotiations began in between Iran and three European powers over its nuclear work, Tehran was struggling to assemble uranium-enrichment centrifuges. The current round of negotiations that concluded successfully in Vienna on July 14, , saw Iran in possession of more than 18, centrifuges. Even then, a nuclear-armed Iran was neither imminent nor inevitable. Although a number of additional matters delayed the achievement of a deal at the eleventh hour, four key issues were at the core of international concerns over Tehran's nuclear activities:. Iran's enrichment process is based on using centrifugal force to purify the active isotope in natural uranium. Depending on the level of purity to which it is enriched, the resulting fissile material could fuel nuclear reactors, be used medically or serve as bomb material.
However, the deal has been in jeopardy since President Donald J. Trump withdrew the United States from it in In retaliation for the U.
Not only did the final agreement on the JCPOA address a highly sensitive issue for international peace and security through detailed and comprehensive commitments, but it also succeeded in gathering together a diverse set of state parties, with varying levels of antipathetic relations among them in previous years. The arguments raised by the parties to justify their conduct manifest different understanding regarding the legal nature of the JCPOA as well as the application of other relevant rules of international law. That decision marked the end of the coordinated lifting of nuclear related sanctions endorsed by the UN Security Council with resolution It goes without saying that Iran could not make reference to any provisions of the JCPOA when it filed the application before the ICJ, as it sought to found the jurisdiction on the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights:  in the order on the request for provisional measures, the Court observed that the re-imposition of sanctions — including the revocation of licences and authorizations granted for certain commercial transactions, the ban on trade of certain items, and limitations to financial activities — might be regarded as relating to certain rights and obligations of the Parties under the Treaty. There is no reference to the violation of the commitments under the nuclear deal. It remains that the EU also qualified the update of the regulation as part of its support to the continued, full and effective implementation of the JCPOA, by sustaining legitimate trade and economic relations between the EU and Iran, which were normalised when nuclear-related sanctions were lifted as a result of the JCPOA. The update of the blocking regulation apparently conveys the message of a continuity in the position of EU countries.
While the heated exchanges of the past between the Iranian regime and Israel could be analyzed as political posturing, the latest tensions must be taken seriously.
EU- Logos. The primary objective was to prevent Iran from developing a technology that would allow it to build atomic bombs. In this article, we will first address to the reasons that paved the way towards the nuclear agreement and explain its content.